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12 April 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
SUBJECT : Possible Reorganization of the
Office of Security - Addendum

1. In my discussion paper on the possible reorganization of the Office of Security, I neglected to address the responsibilities of the fourth major unit under the Deputy Director of Security for Personnel Security and Investigations--the Support Division.

2. The Support Division would continue with most or all of the responsibilities that are presently assigned to the Operational Support Division. In addition to this,

25X1C [REDACTED] would be assigned to this unit, and Support Division would be providing help and assistance to Staff employees on a 24 hours a day basis. The overall orientation would go from "operational" support to the Clandestine Services, to all types of support to all elements of the Agency. There would be direct contact with

25X1C [REDACTED] approach, of responding rather than delegating, would have to persist. A lot of the Security Research Staff functions, as it relates to special inquiries for CI Staff, Angus Thuermer, Walter Pforzheimer, etc., would be handled by this Division. Again, the name of the game would be "support" in the broad sense of the term, not merely support to operations.

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3. I have already indicated that the selection of right people will be very important if the reorganization is to work properly. This would definitely be the situation with respect to the Support Division, because it would have to combine the best of DDS/PS and DDS/IOS. As has already been indicated, the Deputy might have some specific area of responsibility, so that there is a good balance between the philosophies of Personnel Security Division and the existing Operational Support Division.

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Discussion Paper on the Possible
Reorganization of the Office of Security

1. Attached herewith as Tab A is an Office of Security organizational structure which incorporates a number of proposed changes which might take place over a period of time. The primary emphasis is on combining DDS/IOS with DDS/PS, whereas no significant change is suggested in the third large component, DDS/PTOS. Tab B is a background study on the historical growth of the Office of Security from an organizational structure standpoint.

2. The following would be the most important changes from a management or philosophical standpoint:

A. There would be a Deputy Director of Security for Personnel Security and Investigations (DD/PSI), with four divisions coming within his sphere of authority.

B. Personnel Security Division would be responsible for all types of clearances and approvals issued by the Office of Security. This would cover both "covert and overt" cases, external and internal, staff type and operational. It would include all categories of industrial clearances, and all categories of codeword clearances. The name of the game would be "clearance."

C. Investigations and Polygraph Division would combine the two principal information or fact gathering components. The key point is that this Division would have no clearance responsibilities, there would be no appraisal function, but IPD would have the mission in life of pulling together a complete package of material, whether the data is acquired through investigative or technical means. (At first blush, the polygraph and investigative functions do not appear to mesh, but the polygraph function overlaps into a number of areas, and the TO is now so small, it would be difficult to keep it as a separate Division). Combining IRD and ID might have some advantages by encouraging cross fertilization and the development of generalists rather than interrogation specialists, or even investigative specialists.

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D. Security Records and Communications Division would remain basically the same, but there would be increased emphasis on [redacted] computers, and the microfiche program. In view of the fact that Personnel Security Division would be handling all clearances, overt and covert, SR&CD would eliminate the "covert" file system. The number of security volumes would depend strictly on the amount of material that need be filed.

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E. If Security Research Staff is abolished at some point in the future, there might be some advantage in establishing a small Counterintelligence Unit, no more than one or two people, and assign it to the office of the ADD/PSI, or possibly to the Chief, Personnel Security Division. The key point is that this unit would operate close to the flow of cases, CI would be built into the system, and the senior Counterintelligence Specialist would monitor and otherwise utilize the services of all Divisions in DDS/PSI. This unit might also logically have responsibility for FBI liaison, but the important point is that the unit would be operating for the Office of Security and not CI Staff. It would not be responsible for the Thuermer/Pforzheimer contacts, as the Support Division would handle any and all special requests for data. Again, the overall intent is to eliminate the actual and philosophical barriers between PSD and SRS, attempting to salvage the best from both worlds.

3. With respect to the overall concept, the basic theme would be to clarify and simplify areas of responsibility, while encouraging the development of security generalists rather than specialists. The DDS/PSI would be a large unit of four main divisions, and possibly a very small counter-intelligence unit. There might be some advantage in giving the Assistant Deputy Director of Security for Personnel Security and Investigations some prime responsibility for managing or overseeing two of the Divisions, while the Deputy Director would devote a little more attention to the remaining Divisions. In effect, the #2 man would have a full time job twelve months a year, and we would be in a defensible position re potential charges of being top heavy with horse holders.

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4. I have already mentioned that no substantive change was being suggested in regard to DDS/PTOS. If however, a Counterintelligence Specialist, or a Special Assistant for CI, is assigned to DDS/PSI, it might be an equally balanced approach to assign a Computer Specialist, or Special Assistant for Computer Matters, to DDS/PTOS to keep in close touch with rapidly advancing technology in the computer security field. In substance, [REDACTED] is more or less operating in this fashion at the present time, even though he does not have the formal title. His responsibilities do strike me as being somewhat above and beyond pure physical security.

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5. There has already been a discussion of the interplay and overlap between the Executive and Planning Division with the Administration and Training Staff. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] has been working very closely with A&TS on the Program Call submission of 3 April 1973, and there will be increased continuing responsibilities in monitoring our programs from a "money, personnel, and planning" standpoint. If Executive and Planning Division is abolished and/or combined with A&TS, you might wish to rename the unit "Management and Services" or "Management and Administration" to more accurately reflect these new responsibilities.

6. At this juncture, I would suggest we adopt a wait and see attitude in relation to the Special Security Center, keeping it under the cognizance of the Acting Executive Officer at this point. There are some specific functions, however, which might more logically be transferred to other elements of the Office of Security, dependent upon future developments. We might wish to rethink the entire concept of the Special Security Center in terms of it coming under the Office of Security. In any case, the [REDACTED] Working Group is working on this, and the situation might be resolved through the natural course of events.

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
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OFFICE OF SECURITY



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The following pertinent information has been extracted from the Security Program of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1941-68, Volume I, An Overview. The specific sections site the source pages.

I. Historical Background on Organization

Since, historically, security had been a command function, many of the early considerations were related to identifying those aspects of security which would be best performed by a centralized security authority. Of necessity, early consideration of the centralized security authority were primarily concerned with the security selection of personnel, and this function has remained the principal activity of the Office of Security. The extensive investigative organization required to support this function, however, provided a personnel base which could be channeled into other areas of security support, resulting in the development of a professional security corps, able to operate as an important part of the Agency's overall mission.

The first 20 years of the Agency's existence were marked by many political and social changes. These have brought about changes in the nature of the threat, thereby resulting in changes in the overall pattern of security counteraction. (pp. 14-15)

II. Personnel Selection

The security screening of personnel for employment or other use was a major preoccupation of I&SO from 1947 to 1954. The Agency was rapidly expanding its personnel and activities both domestically and abroad.

Within I&SO the exercise of the security screening function was divided between the Security Division and the Special Security Division. The Security Division performed I&SO security clearance responsibility for all overt and semi-covert applicants, and, in addition, for those individuals used under overt contracts, overt intelligence sources, and domestic guard and char force employees. Additionally, they performed separate assessments related to the individual being provided access to Special Intelligence Information,

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
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and provided security indoctrination to personnel prior to overseas assignment. The Special Security Division shared with the Clandestine Services responsibility related to the clearance or approval of individuals to be employed or used by the Agency under covert circumstances. (The division of responsibility between the Special Security Division and the Clandestine Services, is reflected in [redacted] last revised 17 July 1959). 25X1A (pp. 90-91)

III. Polygraph Program

Although the first use of the polygraph within CIA was related to the security screening processes, its value to CIA operational activities was quickly recognized.



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IV. Counterintelligence

Late in 1949 a small CI Staff was established in I&SO to maintain continuing vigilance against possible penetration of CIA by agents inimical to the interests of the United States. On 12 August 1952, the CI Staff was redesignated the Security Research Staff (SRS), at which time it took over functions of the Technical Research Staff of I&SO related to experimentation with equipments and techniques to be used to counter penetration of CIA by foreign intelligence operatives through its personnel. Much of the early experimentation in the use of the polygraph as an aid to the personnel security screening processes was conducted in SRS.

The CI Staff of I&SO and SRS, which consisted of no more than 15 employees during the 1949-54 period, conducted a program of continuing research to identify possible

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patterns of penetration of CIA through its personnel and also maintained vigilance related to potential or actual personnel security risks within the Agency. To this end, fruitful liaison was maintained with other intelligence and security segments of the Federal government (including the FBI) and with the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington. In November 1952, the Chief, I&SO directed that one representative each be designated within the Security Division and the Special Security Division to review current personnel security investigative cases from the standpoint of possible penetration efforts and to coordinate where appropriate with SRS. I&SO continued to compile its own indices related to suspect persons and organizations and thereby added to the Agency's overall counterintelligence knowledge. (pp. 108, 109, 110)

V. Investigations and Operational Support

Following a survey conducted by the Agency's Management Staff, the Security Office was reorganized in December 1954. The survey recommended a reorganization of the Office to provide two functional deputy directors in addition to the existing Director and Deputy Director. Each of the new deputy directors would exercise specific jurisdiction over a principal operating component of the Office--namely, personnel and physical security support on the one hand, and investigations and operational security support on the other.

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The Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational Support (DD/IOS) supervised the activities of the Security Support Division [REDACTED]. The Security Support Division was divided into the Investigations Branch and Operational Support Branch, with the former's activities related to the security screening of personnel proposed for covert use, and the latter involved in all other matters of support to covert activities of the Agency.

In October 1956, there was a reorganization of the Investigations Branch of the Security Support Division along general geographical rather than functional lines. The resulting "desk" breakdown within the Branch (IB-1, Europe; IB-2, Far East; IB-3, Western Hemisphere; in addition to the U-2 Project and IB-4, International

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Organization) was structured to accommodate its organization to that of the operating components of the Agency. (Comment: A more factual statement might be that it was structured to accommodate the Clandestine Services.) IB-5 (the "open" desk) had no security clearance responsibilities, but instead serviced the investigative requirements of the Personnel Security Division, transmitting them to the field offices for action.

In September 1962, the organizational composition of the Investigations Division (raised to Division status in 1961) of DD/IOS was again altered, primarily to accommodate the increase of Agency activities related to proprietary organizations and intelligence collection through technical means necessitating gross industrial research and development programs. The Division was redivided into four Branches: ID/1 (all covert DDP security clearance or organizations); ID/2 [REDACTED] 25X1A ID/3 (previously referred to as the "open" desk); and ID/4 (Covert R&D programs of interest to the Deputy Director for Research.)

A great influence on Office of Security organizational adjustments during this period were suggestions and recommendations contained in the report of the Inspector General's Survey of the Office of Security of December 1960, although the full extent of the suggestions were not adopted. . . . Within the IOS Directorate, a continuity of effort could be traced back through the Special Security Division to SSU at the end of World War II. The IG report also noted that in 1947 the SSD was brought theoretically into a unified Agency security component; but actually the unification effort did not result in merger, but rather in two separate systems under a unified command. Internal procedures were developed over the years gave effect to, and solidified, this separation of interests.

The IG's report stated that experience had shown that it was not necessary to have a complete separation of covert and overt support functions. . . . The IG suggested a reorganization of the Office of Security along strictly functional lines without regard of separation of covert and overt support; for example, a Personnel Security Division, an Investigations Division, a Technical Division (to include both the polygraph and the technical countermeasures functions) and a Security Operations Division. (pp. 122-128, 133-134)

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
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FIGURE 1

OFFICE OF SECURITY

December 1968



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
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
FIGURE 2

December 1946

OFFICE OF
SPECIAL OPERATIONS



Western European Branch Northern European Branch Central European Branch South European Branch African Branch Middle Eastern Branch Far Eastern Branch Latin American Branch Training Branch Source Control Branch Special Projects Branch Special Support Branch Special Division Branch P&A Branch CIG Branch



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
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FIGURE 3

SECURITY OFFICE

1 December 1954

Director of Security
Deputy Director of Security
Executive Officer



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
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FIGURE 4

SECURITY OFFICE ORGANIZATION CHART

5 December 1954




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FIGURE 5

OFFICE OF SECURITY

June 1963



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


Fig. 1

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III. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

A. General

1. The organization of the Office of Security as of the date of the inspection is reflected in the chart on the facing page. In general the Office is divided into three major areas consisting of the Office of the Director with six supporting staff units, and two operational areas under the Deputy Director for Personnel and Physical Security and the Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational Support.

2. At the time of our previous inspection of this office (1954) the organization structure consisted basically of three operating divisions reporting directly to the Director of Security. At the risk of over-simplification, these can be described briefly as the Security Division which was responsible for overt clearances and related matters, the Special Security Division which was responsible for investigations and covert activities, and an Inspection Division which was responsible for certain inspection and survey functions. The Inspection Division has now ceased to exist as a command entity, but the general separation of overt and covert activities continues in substantially the same form. The Security Division has now become the Office of the Deputy Director for Personnel and Physical Security (PPS), and the Special Security Division has evolved into the Office of the Deputy Director for Investigations and Operational Support (IOS). Thus, IOS might be termed the covert security service, and PPS the overt. The general structure of the four larger staffs

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has remained relatively unchanged, although there have been some modifications and the Inspection Staff has been created as a new one-man unit reporting to the Director of Security.



B. The Organizational Structure

1. The present organizational arrangement can best be described as semi-functional. That is, the basic allocation of duties at the division level is on a functional basis, but there are modifications and exceptions attributable to the historical isolation of covert activities. Within IOS a continuity of effort can be traced back through the Special Security Division to the Strategic Services Unit at the end of World War II. In 1947 the SSD was brought into the theoretically unified security component known as the Office of the Executive for Inspection and Security, which subsequently dropped the inspection function and became the present day Office of Security. Actually, however, the unification effort did not result in merger, but rather two separate systems under a single command. The internal procedures which have developed over the years give effect to and solidify this separation of interests. In other sections of this report we have cited instances of unnecessary coordination which serve no purpose other than recognition of assigned perogatives. For

example, until quite recently both IOS and PPS maintained their own separate records systems. These have now been combined into a single Security Records Division, which is a step in the right direction, but here again the integration has not yet been carried to its logical conclusion.

2. We believe that the experience of recent years has proved that it is not necessary to have a complete separation of covert and overt support functions. The polygraph unit (IRD) is one of the best managed components of the Office of Security, and it is a fully integrated unit capable of providing flexible support to overt and covert activities alike. We believe that other sections of the Office of Security could be integrated in similar manner and with similar success, particularly those engaged in the analysis of personnel security information. We also believe that in the normal course of events, with the changing situations and the rotation of personnel, there would be a gradual realization that a duplication of systems to support covert and overt activities separately is inefficient and wasteful of supervisory personnel. What is needed is a controlled acceleration of the natural process of consolidation, since this is the only way to obtain maximum utilization of personnel. We believe that the Director of Security does not fully recognize the degree to which his personal leadership and that of his deputy have been responsible for the success of the security mission, and will be responsible for the immediate future. The objective now should be to develop an effective system of management which is not so thoroughly dependent upon the individual performance of one or two people.




Fig. 2

3. The principal functions of the Office of Security are easily identifiable, and they form the natural basis for an internal system of management. These functions are Personnel Security, Physical Security, Investigations, Technical Support, and Operational Security Support. The staff functions are also rather clearly defined, although we support the conclusion that the Special Research Staff should continue as a separate entity even though its function is not of a purely staff nature. The chart shown as Figure 2 on the facing page is not intended as a proposed organizational chart, but rather as a graphic illustration of a possible alignment of functions. Each of the major divisions should be under the supervision of a chief with the rank of GS-16, and the general allocation of functions should be about as follows:

a. The Personnel Security Division should be responsible for the clearance of all covert and overt personnel and related activities.

b. The Physical Security Division should be responsible for all physical security activities except audio countermeasures.

c. The Investigations Division should be responsible for 25X1A all investigative activity, [REDACTED] headquarters, except the investigation of physical security violations.

d. The Technical Division should be responsible for the polygraph program and the audio countermeasures program. We realize that one of these is basically concerned with personnel security and the other with physical security, but we believe that the degree of

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specialization involved, the aptitudes and the psychological attitudes of the specialists themselves, and the highly technical nature of both programs result in a degree of compatibility not found between these units and the other orthodox security units.

e. The Security Operations Division should be responsible for all operational support programs such as alien affairs, safehouses, post office boxes, coordination of security components attached to operating divisions of the DD/P and the DD/I, etc., and for coordinating with the Investigation Division those requirements which are to be implemented at field stations.

f. The Special Security Staff is new nomenclature for the existing Special Research Staff.

g. The Research Staff should be responsible for conducting basic research in security matters, security criteria, etc., and for coordination of technical research. (In this instance the term "research" is used in the normal sense rather than to indicate a review and analysis in depth of personnel security information.)

h. The Executive Officer should be the management officer for the Director of Security, responsible for the coordination of all activities not specifically related to a substantive security program, including records management and general administration.

i. The Staff Assistants in the immediate office of the Director of Security should handle matters heretofore delegated to the one-man and two-man staffs and sections or assigned on a case officer basis to security officers in one of the divisions.

4. While we recognize the theory leading to the grouping of activities under two functional Deputy Directors of Security (to minimize the number of subordinates reporting directly to the Director of Security), we do not believe that these theories have been borne out in practice. The very nature of the security mission and the personal responsibilities of the Director of Security dictate that he keep himself fully informed, and the delegations of authorities to IOS and PPS must be with this understanding. The Deputies for IOS and PPS are not, and could not be, regarded as deputies who may at their discretion act on behalf of the Director of Security. We did not identify any delegation of authority which established an effective point of decision below the Director of Security which could not as easily have been made to a division chief. On the other hand, "security" is composed of a number of different elements and these cannot be completely separated. The span of supervision of the Director of Security cannot be extended to all of the functional groups, even though he must be fully aware of significant happenings. We believe that the weakness of the system of deputy directors lies in the fact that it does not resolve the command problem but strengthens the separation of functions. That is, they provide day-to-day guidance to division chiefs who do not really need such "super-supervision" and must still refer really important decisions to the Director of Security anyway. Further, the two deputies have specific areas of responsibility and all questions involving overlapping areas must be resolved at the upper level.

5. In view of the above, we believe that the most effective delegation of responsibility for day-to-day operations would be to the chiefs of the operational divisions, and that the major need at the secondary level is for an effective coordinator of command responsibilities which are not limited to a single division's area of interest. In order to achieve this, a Chief of Operations should be an executive agent of the Director of Security for the coordination of all operational matters. Extreme care should be taken to avoid the creation of a bureaucracy at this level, which could easily happen if the position becomes one of function rather than leadership. We view this position as one of a single officer with broad command authorities, responsible for all activities of the Office of Security except those reserved to the Director of Security or delegated to the Executive Officer. During his absence the responsibilities of the Chief of Operations should be temporarily transferred to the Deputy Director of Security rather than to a subordinate officer temporarily brought up from one of the divisions on an "Acting" basis.

6. We recognize that the conclusions drawn above are too broad to be regarded as a detailed blueprint for reorganization, but rather that they establish the requirement for additional study in greater depth. Since this study would be a long-range undertaking and necessarily lead to a consideration of substantive security matters, we feel that it should be conducted by a personal designee of the Deputy Director (Support), and that the individual should be assigned to the Office of Security on an indefinite basis for this purpose.

Recommendation No. 1:

The Deputy Director (Support) assign a qualified representative to the Office of Security to conduct a comprehensive and substantive survey and submit specific reorganization proposals to the Director of Security.

C. Office of the Director of Security

1. Although there has been an increase in the general assignment of responsibilities over the years, the very nature of the security mission requires that the Director of Security be fully aware of even minute details. For this reason the management of the component is an extremely tight group. In theory the Director of Security and his principal deputy constitute a level of senior supervision and policy guidance for the next command echelon, but in practice they provide closer supervision and personally participate in many of its activities. As examples, the Director of Security personally supervises some of the more sensitive operations, and the Deputy Director is permanent Chairman of the USIB Security Committee. The span of supervision is thus theoretically limited to the functional deputies, but the actual span of leadership extends into the most remote areas of the office.

2. The Executive Officer is the "office manager" of the Office of Security. He is generally responsible for the coordination of all non-operational activities and has been engaged in certain aspects of planning for the new building. He is concerned with the refinement of Security Career Service and personnel procedures and is the chairman of the Senior Grades Panel. He is the Executive Officer of the Security Patrol which has been established for protection of Agency

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Approved For Release 2001/07/12 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000700010064-0

25 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Comments on the Office of Security Survey

1. Set forth below are my comments on the Office of Security Survey. The comments are set forth in the same order as listed in Tabs 1, 2 and 3 of the Executive Staff Folder on this subject.

TAB 1 - ITEM 1 - SRD

I see no reason to move SRD to another component unless it is part of a larger move designed to accomplish another purpose. It appears logical that eventually the Clearance Center and SRD should be combined, but this too would be part of a larger move.

TAB 1 - ITEM 2 - GENERAL

I feel that the Office of Security Registry idea is a good one, but it would require further study. I would recommend that the Task Force suggested by the Executive Staff be appointed.

ITEM 3 - FSS

As you are aware, I do not feel that the Foreign Support Staff is serving the purpose originally intended. Whether this is due to the personnel involved or the structure of positions I do not know, but it is probably both. My inclination would be to abolish the Foreign Support Staff and place the personnel actions with A&TS, the writing of cables with the Registry, the cable briefings with the Executive Staff, and liaison with the various divisions on

overseas security with PPS, possibly with the Special Assistant.

ITEM 4 - GENERAL

The problem of briefing dependents under sixteen years of age is a difficult one. In some cases it would be wise, in others not so wise. Too much depends on the maturity of the children. I believe that we should probably continue our present policy - authorizing the employee to brief a child at a point that he feels appropriate.

TAB 2 - ITEM 1 - GENERAL

The problem of following the activities of disaffected or disgruntled employees appears to me to lie more in the area of the Personnel Security Division rather than the Security Research Staff. This would tend to put SRS in the chain of command and away from CI research. In addition, representatives of the PPS side of the house sit on the panel which considers such employees. I would recommend the responsibility remain with PSD.

ITEM 2 - GENERAL

I feel that there should be a central point for the handling of crank mail. I have no strong feelings as to where this should be, but above all, the name should be recorded in SRD so that it will come to light. I have no strong feelings on this particular suggestion.

ITEM 3 - GENERAL

I feel that the counter-intelligence function of the Office of Security should be centralized in one office. I recommend that the CI Support Desk be transferred to SRS. I suggest that we carefully review the possibility of moving some portion of the Protective Branch activities to SRS if, in fact, there is a need to maintain these activities. I have

not seen any positive results on the effects of the Protective Branch and I do not know that their function is a valid one. I feel that SRS should furnish the information utilized in the denied area briefings, but feel that PSD should give the briefings. I also agree that CI information in the Office of Security should be furnished to SRS.

ITEM 4 - Executive Staff

In regard to leaks of classified information, I feel that this is best handled in SRS as opposed to Executive Staff.

ITEM 5 - SRS

Case studies should be done by SRS and the Information Digest appears to be the best vehicle for publication of these case studies.

TAB 3 - ITEM 1 - GENERAL

There is a great deal of history involved in the allegation that there is a duplication of effort between preliminary review and ID/3. In most cases, these two sections look at the same piece of paper, but they do so for different purposes. I am convinced that some sort of preliminary review section is necessary in PSD. I am also convinced that ID/3 should schedule all assignments to the field. I would recommend the following guidelines be followed. In any case where a background investigation is required this should be so indicated by the Preliminary Review Section and all scheduling should be done by ID/3. This system is being applied in staff cases and should be extended to include all of the cases where background investigation is required. In other cases, such as reinvestigation cases or cases which do not require a full investigation, the extent of coverage can be indicated by the Preliminary Review Section. ID/3 would then be in

a position to expand the coverage if they feel they can do so economically but they could not reduce the coverage without coordination with the Preliminary Review Section.

ITEM 2 - Alien Affairs Staff

The proposal to move the Alien Affairs Staff under the DD/IOS is an old one. This Staff operates virtually independently and it does not really matter whether they operate as a staff or as a part of IOS with this exception; if the group operates under IOS it would enable IOS to furnish backup personnel to fill in when professional or clerical personnel are on leave. In addition, it would enable IOS to follow the defector picture to ensure the security of movement and housing of such defectors.

The Chief, Alien Affairs Staff opposes this move, primarily on the basis that his position as a Staff Chief gives him stature. His position may or may not be valid, but I personally feel that it is not particularly strong.

In summary, I do not feel that it makes much difference where the Alien Affairs Staff fits into the TO. I think it will work better under IOS if it can be done as a part of a larger reorganization and would not affect the morale of the Staff.

ITEM 3 - SPECIAL SECURITY CENTER

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I personally feel that the Chief of this Staff, [REDACTED] should serve on COMOR and act as TSO. If [REDACTED] were transferred or he retired, this would undoubtedly be done immediately. If it is done at the present time, it will have an affect on [REDACTED] and possibly on his Staff. My suggestion on this is to wait until the Center is separated from the rest of the Staff and at that time, transfer the COMOR membership and the TSO position to [REDACTED]

ITEM 4 - INTERROGATION RESEARCH DIVISION

I feel that the best solution to this problem is a better reinvestigation program. If IOS were able to become more current in this program, the problem would be solved. I would recommend that IOS be requested to come up with a plan for improving service on the reinvestigation program and when this is accomplished, the other problem would be solved.

2. These are my comments on the problems raised. I would suggest that we hear all sides to the issues and you make your decision later. The decisions could come in the form of a Directive from you to effect the changes decided upon.

25X1A

Deputy Director of Security